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Abstract It is not uncommon to hear criticisms of the university today. 
From the right, the university is seen as nothing more than a mere 
liberal bastion or hotbed for leftist ideological indoctrination. And 
from the left, the university is considered nothing more than a factory, 
part and parcel of the military- industrial complex, or a mere puppet 
of corporate control. The centrality of corporate, neoliberal logics, 
ideologies of managerialism and excellence, and the universalization 
of individualist policies over and above public purposes all seem 
to indicate that the university is undergoing a major identity crisis. 
What many of these analyses fail to recognize is the underlying 
educational logic at work in higher education — a logic that informs 
both conservative and progressive analyses of the university. Building 
on the work of Giorgio Agamben, we present a critical analysis of the 
connections between the university’s educational logic of learning, 
the rise of student debt, and neoliberalism. We then suggest studying 
as an alternative model of university education that suspends the 
economy of learning and its connections with debt. To further expand 
upon Agamben’s ontological analysis of study as a state of educational 
potentiality, we explore its political and economic dimensions through 
a psychoanalytic- Marxist framework. In particular, we draw upon 
Marxist notions of reification to understand how learning and debt are 
lived by the student, and in turn, how Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic 
notion of dehiscence provides a way in which the student can 
experience studying as a dereified expression of educational life. 
The result will be a theory of study that is capable of undermining 
educational investments made by and through neoliberalism into 
learnification.
Keywords university, crisis, neoliberalism, Agamben, study, student 
debt, potentiality, reification, dehiscence
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It is not uncommon to hear criticisms of the university today. From the right, the 
university is seen as nothing more than a 
mere liberal bastion or hotbed for leftist 
ideological indoctrination (see Kors and Sil-
berglate 1999; Horowitz 2007, 2009; Kim-
ball 2008). And from the left, the university 
is considered nothing more than a factory, 
part and parcel of the military- industrial 
complex, or a mere puppet of corporate 
control (see Schrecker 2010; Giroux 2007; 
Giroux and Giroux 2006; Aronowitz 2001; 
Reading 1997). The centrality of corporate, 
neoliberal logics, ideologies of manageri-
alism and excellence, and the universal-
ization of individualist policies over and 
above public purposes all seem to indicate 
that the university is undergoing a major 
identity crisis (Lea 2014). While austerity 
measures are lauded on the right as a form 
of fiscal responsibility, on the left, the very 
same practices signal a radical under-
mining of investments in the democratic 
potential of universities, of study, and of 
research (Giroux 2015). Large- scale trans-
formations in structure, governance, and 
function signal a precipice in the history of 
the university. Beyond criticisms from the 
right and the left, some have started to ask 
deeper questions concerning the very exis-
tence of the university as a particular kind 
of institution. Perhaps we are no longer 
living in an age of the university but rather 
witnessing its eclipse? Are we living in the 
ruins of the university? And if so, does this 
mean that we must search for new forms 
of educational life beyond its walls, or does 
such decay signal a new moment of possi-
ble invention and experimentation (Simons 
et al. 2011)?
Yet even the most strident critics of 
the university (on the right and the left) 
miss an important question: What is the 
precise educational logic of the university 
today that makes it amenable to cor-
poratization, which the neoliberal right 
applauds and the radical left abhors? It is 
our basic contention that both right- wing 
attacks and left- wing utopian revivals have 
failed to adequately address this simple 
question. Rather than propose a political 
agenda to reorganize the university under 
the banner of social justice, or propose an 
economic solution to its declining status, 
or propose a new formula for improving 
student outputs across the curricula, we 
suggest instead a turn to a more basic 
and fundamental philosophical concern: 
how the very educational logic of the 
contemporary university coincides with the 
economic logic of late capitalism itself. If 
the left leaves this fundamental question 
unanswered, then, as Paulo Freire once 
observed, the very same pedagogical logic 
of oppression will simply be reproduced 
under a “liberatory” guise (2001).
With students in Germany recently 
proclaiming “We Are No Human Capital!” 
we can begin to understand the political, 
economic, and educational dimensions 
that unite the university and late capital-
ism. As Jan Masschelein and Maartin 
Simons argue, “the term ‘students’ has 
become synonymous with the resources 
to be exploited, the talents to be mobilized, 
the object of investment, the guarantee 
of a country’s competitiveness or, when 
addressing the possible disobedient 
component of human capital, the custom-
ers to be seduced” (2011: 165). Against 
this backdrop, students are protesting the 
collapse of education in the discourses 
and practices of learning as flexible skill 
development. Indeed, we are living in what 
could be described as a “learning society” 
(Masschelein et al. 2006), wherein lifelong 
learning is just as much an educational 
mantra as it is an economic imperative to 
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become a self- regulating, self- directing 
entrepreneur capable of continual adap-
tation to the flexible and highly volatile 
market. While Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri (2012) list the indebted, the medi-
atized, the securitized, and the represented 
as the key subjective figures that have 
emerged from within the neoliberal crisis, 
we would argue that the current educa-
tional apparatus of the industrialized West 
has also produced the subjective figure 
of the “life- long learner.” If, as Hardt and 
Negri argue, the real subsumption of social 
relations by the factory has happened 
under late capitalism, then so too have we 
witnessed the simultaneous “learnifica-
tion” (Biesta 2014) of society. The univer-
sity is at the very crux of this intersection 
between economic, educational, and social 
forces transforming the logic of learning 
into an economic logic of production, and 
transforming the economic logic of produc-
tion into an educational logic of learning. 
As such, it is not good enough to merely 
critique the financialization and bureaucra-
tization of higher education. Underlying 
these changes is another educational 
change: the hegemonic dominance of 
learning.
But critique is not enough. Any 
deconstruction of the logic of learning 
must be coupled with a reconstructive 
move to find alternative educational logics 
that interrupt and suspend learnification. 
One such possibility can be found in the 
distinction between learning and studying. 
For Masschelein and Simons studying is 
“free time” (2011: 167) within the public 
space of the university. As opposed to 
the student as “not yet” (the employee, 
the citizen) who “must be” (this or that 
subject with x, y, and z skills), the student 
should be rethought of as the one who 
studies without determinate ends, without 
identifiable interests, and thus, one who is 
open, exposed, and attentive to the world 
(Simons and Masschelein 2009). In a world 
of quotas, bottom lines, and instrumental 
calculations, the student as studier is the 
political figure par excellence: the one who 
suspends the underlying educational logic 
of the system of neoliberalism, the one 
who prefers not to participate in entrepre-
neurial self- (re)construction, the one who 
disidentifies with the role of learning to 
labor, the one who prefers not to pay his or 
her financial debts.
In order to theorize the nature of study 
and why the fate of the university is linked 
to this practice, we will explore the work of 
Giorgio Agamben. Agamben is now recog-
nized in diverse disciplines as seminal for 
understanding politics, literature, cultural 
studies, theology, philosophy, and linguis-
tics. Yet with multiple edited collections 
on his work1 as well as multiple secondary 
sources that summarize, critique, and 
analyze his corpus, there has been little 
focus on Agamben’s ongoing theory of 
the act of studying.2 This article hopes to 
develop and extend Agamben’s initial com-
ments and observations on studying by 
(a) juxtaposing studying with learning, (b) 
examining the ontology of the potentiality 
of study, and (c) demonstrating the impor-
tance of Agamben’s insights into studying 
for intervening into current debates on the 
fate of the university.3 But Agamben will 
be more or less a jumping- off point for our 
analysis. Agamben only makes passing 
remarks about the university, dismissing 
them as merely part and parcel of a con-
temporary problem with the relationship 
between the past and the present (2007a: 
95). Indeed, it is most peculiar that Agam-
ben does not mention the university in his 
essay “What Is an Apparatus?” (2009), 
for it would seem that the university is, 
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as we will argue, a defining apparatus of 
learnification. Thus his own critique of 
the university is limited. Further, he does 
not connect his scattered notes on study 
with any positive potentiality that remains 
within the university to become what he 
might call a “counter- apparatus” (Agam-
ben 2009: 19). If an apparatus captures 
and monitors the gestures of living beings, 
then the studious university might very 
well offer a profanation of this apparatus 
and thus reopen the question of a common 
university or the free time of the univer-
sity (as Masschelein and Simons would 
argue). Despite the possibilities as well as 
the urgency of such a project, Agamben 
does not follow through on this line of 
inquiry, thus producing an opportunity for 
further critical reflection and investigation. 
Picking up on the potentiality that remains 
within Agamben’s own work and moving 
it forward, we hope to provide a robust 
groundwork for understanding the radical 
potential of study to undermine learning 
and thus profane the neoliberal university 
and its twin logics of human capital invest-
ment and financial debt.
To complete this groundwork, 
Agamben’s ontological analysis of poten-
tiality and studying needs to be further 
developed in relation to psychoanalytic 
Marxism, which enables us to further 
Agamben’s analysis in two respects. First, 
Marxism helps ground ontological claims 
within the specific neoliberal economy of 
learning and debt. And second, psycho-
analysis helps explore how ontological con-
ditions are lived/experienced by the studier 
(as opposed to the learner). In terms of the 
former, we draw on the classic Marxian 
notion of reification; for the latter, we turn 
to Jacques Lacan’s theory of psychical 
dehiscence. The result will be a theory of 
study that is capable of undercutting the 
ontological, psychological, and educational 
investments made by and through neolib-
eralism into learnification.
Studying
It is not at all clear that Agamben’s brief, if 
not cursory, remarks on the logic of study-
ing were meant to be a radical interruption 
and suspension of the hegemonic logic 
of learning, yet the provocative fragments 
that he gives his reader offer a starting 
point for imagining an education that is not 
beholden to the process of measurement 
and quantification that is found throughout 
all sectors of the “educational economy.” 
Briefly summarized, studying for Agam-
ben is an “interminable” and “rhythmic” 
activity that not only loses a sense of its 
own end but, more importantly, “does not 
even desire one” (1995: 64). The studier 
seems suspended in a state of oscilla-
tion between sadness and inspiration, of 
moving forward and withdrawing from 
certain aims, certain forms of identifiable 
subjectivities, and certain outcomes. Thus 
studying emerges as a kind of potential 
state of educational being that interrupts 
any notion of educational “growth” or 
educational “realization” of latent possi-
bilities. Indeed the studier is defined by 
three “weak” powers (Lewis 2014) that 
include (a) “preferring not” to participate in 
educational reproduction, (b) suspending 
occupational or vocational destinations 
(the studier is a learner as not a learner), 
and (c) deactivating divisions between 
the ignorant and the knowledgeable (the 
studier is neither ignorant nor a master, 
thus rendering inoperative institutional 
hierarchies, ritualized forms of legitimation, 
and codified social roles).
Agamben points out that studying  
and stupefying are closely connected 
(1995: 64). Stupidity here is not simply a 
Cultural Politics
Published by Duke University Press
The STUDIOUS UNIVERSIT Y
C
U
LT
U
R
A
L 
P
O
L
IT
IC
S
3
3
3
lack of knowledge but rather the experi-
ence of bewilderment when all vocations 
are left idle and when all verifiable signs 
of one’s capabilities are suspended. If we 
think of learning as oriented toward the 
measurability of determinate, reliable skill 
sets that can be put to work for economic 
growth, studying suddenly appears to be 
a “useless” activity, devoid of quantifiable 
significance in the life of the student. To 
study is to undergo a certain inoperativity 
of the very logic of learning, which empha-
sizes productivity of an entrepreneurial self 
who is defined in relation to the simultane-
ous accrual of (a) human capital recognized 
by the market as a valued commodity and 
(b) financial debt that permanently binds 
his or her potentiality to the fluctuations of 
the market. Indeed, within the educational 
logic of learning, studying would merely 
be an obstacle to be overcome, a waste 
of time at best and at worst an antieduca-
tional distraction, delaying actualization of 
human capital and thus putting life itself at 
risk by incurring more debt.
As for the studier, he or she remains 
oddly invisible within the logic of learning — 
only included as an excluded outsider who 
refuses to “play by the rules” of institu-
tional life. The studier changes majors too 
often, does not promise to graduate on 
time, seems to never take the required 
courses, and falls off track of the expected 
“freshman experience” prescribed by vari-
ous administrators. To be stupefied means 
that the very predicates defining one’s 
identity as this or that kind of person with 
these or those definable skills and specific 
career goals are suspended, leaving one 
without a specific location within the order 
of production. Hence Agamben’s famous 
example of the paradigm of study: Bartleby 
the Scrivener — a figure that is paradox-
ical precisely because he prefers not to 
accommodate himself to a world of evalua-
tion, performance quotas, and measurable 
improvement. Like Bartleby, the studier is 
exhausted and exhausting (for any learning 
apparatus).4 He or she is indifferent to the 
economic rationale of the institution, which 
commands one to produce evidence, 
move toward confirmation of work done, 
assesses progress toward definite goals.
Given the economy of learning found 
at the heart of the university, studying is 
the only educational logic that frees up 
potentiality from its subservience to actu-
alization (Lewis 2013). Here is the major 
distinction between learning (which always 
concerns ends and measurements) and 
study (which concerns means released 
from ends and thus from quantification). 
Through education, the subject suffers 
an “alteration (a becoming other) through 
learning” where “the passage from the act 
implies an exhaustion and destruction of 
potential” (Agamben 2005: 179, 136). It is 
precisely this model of potentiality that cur-
rently informs discourses and practices of 
learning. Learning emphasizes investment 
into potentiality in order to fully actualize 
this potential in the form of performance 
outcomes and human capital develop-
ment. Here the ontology of the educational 
subject is structured according to the strict 
logic of “not yet”: not yet an adult, not yet 
a citizen, not yet a productive member 
of society. Thus the educational subject 
must suffer an alteration through learning 
that destroys the “not yet” in order to fully 
actualize a latent potentiality for adulthood, 
citizenship, or productivity (i.e., transform 
the “not yet” into the necessity of the 
“must be” of the professional, employable 
adult). But what exactly must be lost in 
the translation of potentiality into actuality? 
By thinking through potentiality as such, 
Agamben discovers that im- potentiality is 
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the “capability of the act in not realizing 
it” (1998: 45) and thus “permits human 
beings to accumulate and freely master 
their own capacities, to transform them 
into ‘faculties’ ” (2011: 44). Im- potentiality 
holds together potentiality and impoten-
tiality (or the ability to be and not to be in 
its totality). When potentiality passes into 
actuality, it is impotentiality (rather than 
potentiality) that is sacrificed. To fulfill 
potentiality is to destroy the ability to not 
be in the name of the economy of learning. 
The contingencies of impotentiality are 
what must be sacrificed in order for the 
individual to learn x skills for x purposes 
predetermined in advance by the social 
norms, traditions, and values that inform 
educational practices. Indeed, potentiality 
in this framework is more or less reduced 
to a series of possibilities that can either 
be actualized or not actualized. The logic in 
such cases operates through the function 
of the “or,” which separates and divides 
potentiality into a series of discrete, func-
tionally oriented, and exclusive possibilities. 
Apparatuses of learning demand that you 
declare this or that degree, become this or 
that kind of employee. The university as 
an apparatus of learning functions through 
such subtractive exclusions: increasingly 
controlling and managing students’ choices 
through prescripted and guaranteed “four- 
year graduation plans” or accelerated 
“fast tracks” that cram as many courses 
as possible into condensed summer and 
winter sessions. The result is a narrowing of 
the curricular choices, streamlined majors 
with little room for electives, and a collapse 
of university life into economic viability. 
Students emerge with narrowing skill sets 
designed to meet the needs of existing 
markets, thus transforming potentiality into 
recognizable skills to be bought and sold as 
a form of human capital.
But this is only the first movement in 
the learnification of the university under 
neoliberalism. Stated bluntly, lifelong 
learning is coupled with lifelong debt. 
As Jason Thomas Wozniak has argued, 
reading philosophers of indebtedness such 
as Maurizio Lazzarato and David Graeber, 
students now experience their educations 
through the lens of their indebtedness (see 
Graeber 2011; Lazzarato 2012; Wozniak 
2015; Williams 2006; Marez 2010; see 
also Williams 2006 and Marez 2010 on 
the “pedagogy of debt”). Graduates will 
live in the shadow of their debt, either 
through defaulting or living to service their 
debt by scrambling in a poor job market 
to make enough money to pay what is 
quickly becoming the next generation’s 
“first mortgage”: their education. Before 
they graduate, students and their families 
sense the pressure of debt at every turn: 
which classes to take, books to buy, and 
food to eat. In our ontological reading, 
learning sacrifices impotentiality (ability not 
to be) so that potentiality can pass seam-
lessly into actualization — one can “realize 
one’s full potential.” The goal is to pro-
duce evidence of one’s worth in relation 
to market variables. Simultaneously the 
student is also defined in terms of debt 
accrued through this process. Debt returns 
the student to a perpetual state of “not 
yet.” One is never free from a relation to 
one’s economic servitude. In this second 
case, one’s potentiality (the ability to be) 
is sacrificed. In both cases, ontological 
im- potentiality (as the simultaneous ability 
to be and not to be as experienced through 
study) is split. Thus we have to think learni-
fication (Biesta 2014) with theories of debt 
(Lazzarato 2012) in order to understand the 
constitutive violence of neoliberal educa-
tional logics.
Agamben asks: What is an experience 
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of potentiality that does not sacrifice the 
im- potential? What would it mean to expe-
rience im- potentiality as such? Those who 
have knowledge are in potential, meaning 
that they equally have the capability to 
bring knowledge into actuality and not bring  
knowledge into actuality. Agamben then 
gives the example of an architect who “is 
in potential insofar as he has the poten-
tial to not- build, the poet the potential to 
not- write poems” (1999: 179). By conserv-
ing itself, potential remains im-potential. 
Instead of sacrificing im-potentiality, we 
sometimes find strange examples wherein 
im- potentiality is actualized — where 
the act of actualizing is equally an act of 
de- actualization. Studying is one such 
act — is the educational paradigm of 
de- actualization, a point of indifference 
between potentiality and actuality.
In fact, it is the experience of im- 
potentiality that is the experience of 
freedom. Agamben writes: “Here it is 
possible to see how the root of freedom is 
to be found in the abyss of potentiality. . . . 
To be free is, in the sense we have seen, 
to be capable of one’s own impotential-
ity” (1999: 183). What makes us human, 
according to Agamben, is precisely the 
capability to not be, to remain im- potential. 
It is this paradoxical existence that opens 
necessity to contingency — to the potential 
to act otherwise or to be otherwise. “Evil,” 
in this sense, is derivative of a flight from 
an indetermining im- potentiality into the 
logic of pure or complete actualization for a 
predetermined end. Citing Agamben: “Evil 
is only our inadequate reaction when faced 
with this demonic element [our impoten-
tial], our fearful retreat from it in order to 
exercise — founding ourselves in this flight 
some power of being” (1993: 31 – 32). Thus 
to enable students to experience their im- 
potentiality means that they must be given 
the chance to experience their capability not 
to be — their capability to prefer not to be 
human capital, to prefer not to pay off their 
debts. Indeed, im- potentiality does not sim-
ply separate potentiality from im-potentiality 
(thus sacrificing contingency for necessity, 
possibility for impossibility), rather it recog-
nizes that the subject emerges precisely in 
the gap that separates and binds together 
opposite forces in the atopic space existing 
between desubjectification (an unnamed 
subject position) and subjectification (recog-
nizable within the order of things). Instead 
of separating potentiality into a series of 
mutually exclusive possibilities (to be or not  
to be), im- potentiality holds possibilities 
together, returning them to a more primordi-
ally indeterminate state (to be and not to be 
simultaneously). The educational experi-
ence of im- potentiality is none other than 
the stupification brought about through the 
interminable sway of study wherein the  
studier forgets any desire for ends, for 
assessments, for measurement. This 
forgetting is less a refusal than a preferring 
not to be defined by any set of predicates 
that would exclude the contingency to 
choose otherwise. In this sense, to study is 
to experience educational freedom that is 
antithetical to the capitalist logic of learning; 
it is to live an educational life.
In what follows, we will take this basic 
ontological characterization of study as a 
starting point for a much more detailed 
analysis of the underlying psychological 
economy of study. In particular, we will 
find useful tools in both Marxist notions 
of reification and Lacanian notions of 
dehiscence. Together, these concepts 
will further explicate the precise nature of 
“suspension” at work in study, as well as 
the paradoxical subjectivity of the studier 
as neither this nor that. The goal will be to 
realign the university with the free time 
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and space of study, and thus cut the ties 
that bind the university and the psycholog-
ical structures underpinning the formation 
of “the student” to capitalist logics.
Groundwork: Psychoanalysis and 
Marxism, Reification and Dehiscence
Since study is the educational act that 
suspends predicates defining the subject 
as this or that kind of individual with these 
or those kinds of skills, it is a lingering in 
im- potentiality — a “preferring not to.” In 
this sense, studying renders inoperative 
the basic structure and function of learning 
in society: socialization. For Biesta learning 
is essentially the functionalization of edu-
cation for social, political, and economic 
purposes (2014). We would argue learning, 
as discussed by Biesta, becomes the  
specific mode of reification in the sphere 
of education. In this section of the article, 
we will outline a theory of reification as  
it relates to learning. It is only then that 
the rhythmic indeterminacy of study gains 
its full political and economic importance. 
Study, as theorized in the previous section, 
is the act that suspends extant predicates 
in the psyche, opening up the possibilities 
for new forms of educational subjectiv-
ity beyond “the learner.” In this sense, 
Marxism’s insights provide a powerful way 
to understand the economic and political 
dimensions of Agamben’s reflections  
on im- potentiality as a concept freed from 
subservience to any demands for actual-
ization in this or that form and of potenti-
ality freed from financial debt. Psychical 
reification is precisely how the sacrifice of 
im- potentiality is lived and experienced  
by the student.
To delimit the power of the studious 
pause and apply it in the contemporary 
context of the university, we must be 
careful and clear with respect to the two 
psychical phases between which this 
studious hesitation constitutes a move-
ment. Studying means going from one 
phase to another within. The first phase 
we call reification. The second phase we 
call dehiscence. In short, between the 
reified subjectivity of the learner and the 
free subjectivity of the studier, we find a 
moment of psychical dehiscence through 
which the im- potentiality of the learner is 
given back to itself. In conclusion, we will 
complete our argument for the Marxist- 
psychoanalytic groundwork for a studious 
university beyond learnification.
As Georg Lukács first argued, reifica-
tion is the situation of the psyche included 
in capitalism. When one’s own activities 
are treated as commodities to be bought 
and sold, “[commodity] stamps its imprint 
upon the whole consciousness of man; 
his qualities and abilities are no longer an 
organic part of his personality, they are 
things which he can ‘own’ or ‘dispose of’ 
like the various objects of the external 
world” (Lukács 1971: 100). In short, the 
psyche is thingified, and through its thingi-
fication, the psyche becomes a subjective 
universal identical to its objective demands 
in the relations of production (Bewes 2002) 
and the primary mode of intersubjective 
agency under capitalism (Honneth 2008). 
Reification is also the learner’s psychical 
status quo. On this reading, the psyche of 
the learner is a symptom of capitalism’s 
coupling with learnification and learnifica-
tion’s expansion through capitalism. At the 
interface of these two dynamic forces lies 
the reified psychic economy of the learner 
him or herself, which is defined by the 
internalization of the commodity form and 
its externalization in measurable human 
capital development and debt accrual.
Though he may seem an unlikely ally, 
W. V. Quine’s linguistic theorization of 
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being from “On What There Is” is helpful 
in expressing this membership of the sub-
ject into the economy of learnification that 
defines the educational logic of capitalism. 
Quine argues there that being is “being 
within the range of a bound variable” 
(1948: 32). Bracketing the positivism sur-
rounding this claim, the phrasing is helpful, 
because in terms of signifier and signifieds 
composing the psyche, linguistic entities 
like signifiers and signifieds can “bind” the 
“variable” quality of psychical experience. 
What it means to become educated, in this 
sense, is to ensure that certain kinds of 
signifiers hold within the psyche, or bind it. 
The kind of learnification mentioned in  
the first section is a case in point: lifelong 
learning is the constant updating of signifi-
ers binding the psyche. Therefore inclusion, 
or membership, in a social formation — 
being educated, learnified — means being 
within the range of a bound variable. 
Likewise with learning as indebtedness: 
here the psyche is bound to the abstract 
quantity that one owes and that binds 
one’s life to particular institutional relations 
(debtor- creditor).
The economy of learning that forms 
the educational logic of the current univer-
sity is precisely one that reifies the uni-
versity community. The student has only 
one choice in the face of such reification. 
As Lacan warns: “Not that the knowledge 
that you are given is not structured and 
solid. On the contrary, you have only one 
thing to do, which is to weave yourselves 
into it along with those who work, that 
is with those who teach you, under the 
banner of the means of production and, 
consequently, of surplus value” (2007: 
204). In other words, the student becomes 
a subject only through subjecting him or 
herself to the discourse of the university 
that reifies/bounds excessive variables to 
the economy of production. The reified 
commodity (knowledge) is necessary for 
the subject to take up his or her place as 
this or that kind of subject, identifiable by 
these kinds of skills, talents, and aptitudes 
and this or that amount of debt. The result 
of the process of institutional reification is 
a split subject ($): split from his or her con-
stitutive im- potentiality to be rather than; 
split between the potentiality to function 
in a market according to human capital 
development and the im-potentiality asso-
ciated with crippling debt. Im- potentiality 
is bound to certain extant variables, which 
results in the reified psyche of the learner 
as both marketable and in debt. 
Chadwick Matlin, writing for the 
website Medium, describes a series of 
interactions with his father when attending 
Tufts University that clearly illustrate the 
binding of the psyche to marketability and 
debt. Matlin had decided to study anthro-
pology, though both he and his father con-
stantly worried about the “practicality” of 
this decision, given the looming $100,000 
loan they had taken out to pay for the elite 
degree. Matlin (2014) describes what this 
experience was like:
I had to write a term paper about anthropo-
morphism and physique in Teenage Mutant 
Ninja Turtles, and my weekly dodgeball game 
was exhausting. The major questions on my 
mind were, in ascending order: Why couldn’t 
Descartes write a coherent sentence? How long 
until Anna’s Taqueria raises its quesadilla price 
($3.11 . . . for now)? Who was that green- coat 
girl across the quad? I was at college to go to 
college. . . . Yet the backdrop to all of this was 
the debt. How does a person grow attached 
to a place when he knows it’s costing him 
$100,000? How could any student’s first three 
semesters at college — composed of awkward 
late- night study groups, too many a cappella 
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concerts, and a dearth of hands- on seminars — 
be worth $100,000? If my time at Tufts was 
worth $100,000, what did that say about how 
much I thought I was worth? 
In this memoir, reification is a lived 
experience of the learner. The courses 
Matlin takes, his interests in food and 
social experience, are all considered in the 
context of his own “worth” and the value 
of his education. He asks at the end of 
this recollection “what did that say about 
how much I thought I was worth?” His 
university experience is limited, pres-
sured, and prohibited by the sense of a 
dollar value haunting that experience. 
His memoir demonstrates the extent to 
which he “learned” at Tufts University, 
in the sense of learnification. While he 
uses himself as an example in this piece, 
and this experience is limited to an elite 
college and a middle- class family, Matlin 
explores the experiences of students at 
public universities, community colleges, 
and for- profit universities whose experi-
ence is far from elite and exponentially 
more costly. As a political consequence, as 
Andrew Ross has pointed out in Creditoc-
racy (2014) and his work with the Occupy 
Student Debt Campaign, so much student 
debt clearly decreases the likelihood that 
university students will participate in social 
movements, protests, and, we would add, 
studying — all activities for which students 
have traditionally provided essential energy 
and organization.
Like the German students proclaiming 
“We Are No Human Capital!” we can also 
cite the rallying cries during the Occupy 
Student Debt Campaign and StrikeDebt 
movements in New York City: “You Are 
Not a Loan!” Read together they summa-
rize the state of the learner as betwixt and 
between market- ability (as a potentiality) 
and debt(in)ability (as an im-potentiality). 
The phrase “You Are Not a Loan” is telling: 
students taking out massive loans to mort-
gage their futures and identifying with their 
debt as they complete their degrees and 
leave the university is precisely the domi-
nant form of intersubjectivity for students 
today. What they learn at university is that 
they are a loan: their psyche is composed 
of the exorbitant exchange- value of their 
degree. Reification is what happens when 
a student considers him or herself to be 
chattel that can be bought and sold on a 
market (Matlin asking himself, “How much 
am I worth?”). In the terms of our analysis, 
when im- potentiality (for this and that) is 
restricted by an extant commodity prohi-
bition, educational potentiality becomes 
identified as a form of human capital that is 
marketable. Reification is therefore an out-
come of education in capitalism, but also 
a process. The problem with learning is, 
in this sense, that the learner is the result 
of a learning process whose only result 
is the process itself: hence the eternal 
return of labor built into the very structure 
of lifelong learning and lifelong indebted-
ness. In such cases, the student as a thing 
(a debt that is marketable and a market-
ability that is indebted) is structured by 
an extant prohibition over im- potentiality, 
which leaves open the question of which 
signifiers count as “bound” to any specific 
social formation. The learner, by necessity, 
must be an entrepreneur who must prefer 
to sell him or herself like chattel in order to 
survive being in debt. In this case, one’s 
im- potentiality is divided against itself and 
made into an educational thing that can be 
actualized only in relation to a price.
The reification of im- potentiality 
through binding propositions forms the 
psychic kernel of learning as it manifests 
itself today within learnification. Learning 
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is not simply an educational logic restricted 
to the schoolhouse but is rather the very 
dynamic of reification as such, with its 
cyclic movement between result and pro-
cess, potentiality and actuality, between 
training and measuring. To learn is to reify 
im- potential contingency into a necessary 
form of capitalist potentiality that has 
defined predicates with attending condi-
tions of success and failure according to 
extant prohibitions. To “be on the mar-
ket” is shorthand for the pressure of the 
learning society on and over the student 
to be a learner- as- entrepreneur who must 
put Marx’s labor potentiality to work. In 
short, learning is an educational symptom 
of capitalist production. But if this is indeed 
the case, then the very notion of higher 
education for transformation becomes 
paradoxical. Can one learn to unlearn 
learning? If learning reifies, then can one 
dereify the psyche of the learner through 
more learning (and thus re- reification)? The 
problem here is not an easy one to escape 
and, we would argue, largely misplaced by 
proponents of critical pedagogy who have 
failed to address the precise relationship 
between learning and capitalist production.
Here we have to ask (a) how it is that 
dereification is possible and (b) how this 
possibility is an educational possibility. 
Counterintuitively, we would argue that the 
gesture toward an educational logic beyond 
learning lies within the very reification 
process of learning itself — learning in sus-
pension of learning, learning as not learning, 
learning that prefers not to learn . . . and 
thus opens itself up to study. But, before 
arriving at that moment, we have to under-
stand the Lacanian theory of dehiscence, 
which, as Agamben might say, offers the 
slightest of shifts that nevertheless makes 
all the difference. Indeed, as we will argue, 
dehiscence is precisely the threshold that 
both unites and separates reified learning 
and dereified study. For Agamben, all 
apparatuses are posed within a fundamen-
tal tension between subjectification and 
desubjectification. This tension is made 
concrete in the shift between reification 
and dereification, learning and not learning. 
In this sense, dehiscence is precisely the 
psychical mechanism that is missing in 
Agamben’s theory, and the point through 
which we can glimpse how it is that study 
provides a time and space for freedom 
in education to once again emerge from 
within yet against learnification, thus form-
ing the core experience of the university as 
a counter- apparatus.
Lacan labels the gap, or the discordant 
space, at the heart of the human organism 
“dehiscence.”5 Dehiscence is neither a 
positive nor a negative state of affairs of 
the psyche, nor even a “struggle” between 
an “either/or.” The psyche inevitably fills 
the gap with images, language, voices, and 
objects to complete itself. In other words, 
the psyche undergoes cathexis to objects, 
ideas, images, all of which give a sense 
of wholeness to that which is otherwise 
incomplete. But there will be occasions 
where dehiscence occurs: wherein the 
psyche will “return” or become aware of 
its primal discord, which cannot be puzzled 
out, cannot be fully sutured over, by the 
institution of certain extant signifiers. 
Dehiscence is therefore the process and 
product of the primal discord at the heart of 
the human organism — the opening to the 
ecstatic limit of the thou art that. We would 
argue that dehiscence is the phasic com-
plement to reification: the deactivation of 
extant prohibitions in the psyche. In other 
words, dehiscence is the suspension of an 
item’s status as being within the range of a 
bound variable, and thus the deactivation of 
prohibitions on that item. The dehiscence 
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with which we are primarily concerned 
here is the deactivation of prohibitions in 
the psyche particularly with respect to the 
exchange value predicate immanent to 
learnification, which transforms education 
into a commodity (human capital), which 
can be bought and sold on a market.
What does it mean for one to undergo 
an educational dehiscence of the reified 
psyche? An educational dehiscence would 
be a process of study that undoes the 
psychical boundaries introjected through 
learning (boundaries existing between 
marketability and indebtedness). Using 
Agamben’s terminology, im- potentiality 
as experienced in study is a psychic loss 
of cathexis in this or that, thus opening up 
to an experience of that which is indeter-
minate (and hence free, even for a brief 
moment, from marketization or accrual of 
financial debts). For those readers familiar 
with Lacan’s work, dehiscence may also 
be expressed in terms of Lacan’s four 
discourses (the discourses of the mas-
ter, the university, the hysteric, and the 
analyst), though not as an instantiation 
of any one particular discourse. Rather, 
dehiscence occurs during moments of 
transition between discourses; this space 
of betweenness is precisely the space of 
the indeterminant im- potentiality of study.
In dehiscence, in other words, rei-
fication deactivates. A dehisced psyche 
is a studious psyche, a psyche between 
structuration and a- structuration, a psyche 
that is only defined in terms of the im- 
potentiality for this and that structure, 
without being pinned down to any one of 
Lacan’s discourses. This is an indifferent 
position: indifferent in the sense that it 
has no name within any given discourse, 
university or otherwise. The psychological 
space and time of study interrupts the pro-
cess of learning, dwelling in an im- potential 
gap that both joins and separates the 
four discourses that Lacan offers. This is 
not a poststructuralist reading of Lacan 
in the sense that signifiers dissolve into 
endlessly deferred meaning and perpetual 
lack of presence. Quite the contrary. What 
such a reading misses is precisely how, 
in the moment of prolonged dehiscence, 
im- potentiality for this and that is made 
present as a kind of freedom that exists 
between desubjectification and subjecti-
fication (a kind of actualization of deactu-
alization in the form of “preferring not” to 
learn or pay debts).
Conclusion
A studier has suspended his or her psychic 
cathexis and in this state of suspension is 
stupid. Or at least stupid according to the 
discourse and practices of learnification. 
As discussed above, the learner is some-
one who has amassed a certain amount 
of human capital and debt and thus has a 
location within the economic and social 
order. He or she is “valuable” and “valued” 
in terms of a certain level of labor power 
that is always weighed against a certain 
amount of debt. The psyche of the learner 
is bound to a set of variables organized 
along a sliding scale between marketability 
and indebtedness. Yet where does this 
leave the studious psyche — a psyche that 
refuses to give way on its im- potentiality? 
The psyche that has dehisced itself and 
thus falls outside the discourses of the 
analyst, the hysteric, the university, and 
the master? If universities are to be places 
of free time as argued above, then what 
we need are stupid students, for only stu-
pid students would dare to proclaim “We 
Are No Human Capital!” and “You Are  
Not a Loan!” To study is to open oneself 
up to abandonment by a learning society 
that only recognizes potentiality that  
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has been reified into a set of marketable 
skills easily actualizable in relation to the 
needs of markets and into a quantifiable 
amount of debt that is to be repaid.
In this sense, we end with an image 
offered up by Agamben. The studier 
stands before all possibilities with a certain 
detached indifference to personal gains, 
outcomes, and ends. As Agamben argues, 
“Those who are acquainted with long 
hours spent roaming among books, when 
every fragment, every codex, every initial 
encounter seems to open a new path, 
immediately left aside at the next encoun-
ter, or who have experienced the laby-
rinthine allusiveness of that ‘law of good 
neighbors’ whereby Warburg arranged his 
library, know that not only can study have 
no rightful end, but does not even desire 
one” (1995: 64). Such an image of the 
perpetual studier is a profanation of the 
logic of learning that necessitates a clear 
path from cultivating these potentialities in 
order to achieve these goals as set forth 
by market variables. Indeed, to study is to 
offer a profanation of learning now prac-
ticed in the halls of academe. To break the 
cycle of reification that binds the student 
to learning and learning to capital, we need 
to find in stupidity an educational virtue 
of preferring not. This is the educational 
virtue of dehiscence through which the 
bound variables of learning are loosened 
in order to be otherwise than the market 
demands.
In a special issue of Polygraph ded-
icated to the question of the fate of the 
university and of the student in contem-
porary society, editors Luka Arsenjuk and 
Michelle Koerner (2009) further argue 
against the categorization of the student as 
a depoliticized educational consumer and/
or indentured servant who is submitted 
to a host of administrative and managerial 
discourses and practices. If the protests of 
May 1968 taught us a political lesson, it is 
that the figure of the student is not simply 
a sociological category to be managed but 
the name of a political dissensus. Draw-
ing on a host of contemporary theorists 
concerned with the “student crisis” in 
the United States, Arsenjuk and Koerner 
ponder the emergence of a new form of 
educational logic. They write:
Study . . . would not be reducible to the 
accumulation of information, to the current 
organization of knowledge, or to the logic of 
professionalization that governs so many of 
our activities in the University. Study would 
instead name those “unprofessional activities” 
of thought and experimentation that leave one 
intoxicated, those moments of encountering 
in a text or conversation that blow one’s mind, 
driven by curiosities that are closer to pleasure, 
to play, to wandering, to leaving work. From 
here it becomes possible to further disengage 
the figure of the student from the docile con-
sumer or the inert product of the University and 
provide an additional definition of a “student”: 
a student is not only an exploited and invisible 
worker, a person in debt, but also someone who 
struggles to study. Or even, as our favorite dic-
tionary definition of the student has it: a student 
as someone “addicted to study” . . . [and] study 
[is] an activity of sabotage and refusal of . . .  
the dominant form of capitalist production 
today: governance. (2009: 8 – 9)
To struggle to study is to struggle to 
regain the freedom of im- potentiality as a 
capability to be and not to be any one kind 
of subject. It is to reject the fundamental 
logic of learning, opening up the psyche to 
indeterminateness and thus freedom to be 
indifferent to learning and its outcomes.
If we simply remain mired in the dis-
course and practice of learning, studying 
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remains a burden, and the goal becomes 
an attempt to overcome this latency 
period as quickly as possible through the 
constituting act. Thus there is a rush to 
meet national standards through testing 
(“we have to meet standards now so that 
you can become productive citizens!”), or 
there is a rush to close the gap between 
education and political praxis (“we have to 
act now in order to change the world!”), or 
there is the rush to finish the dissertation 
(“the only good dissertation is a done dis-
sertation!”), or there is a rush to transform 
self- study into a quantifiable stream of data 
(“the only way to maximize my happi-
ness is to build a statistical model of my 
daily practices!”), or the need to become 
revolutionary vanguards (“now is the time 
for action, not studying!”), or there is an 
urgency to pay off debt so one can get 
back to living one’s life (“I have to take this 
shitty job so I can get out from under my 
debt!”). In these perspectives, studying is 
an obstacle, an irritant, an infuriating reality 
whose only utility is its reified value for 
reaching another end beyond itself. This 
apparent urgency erases the equally urgent 
need to study in order to rekindle inspira-
tion out of its rhythms and its sadness. 
Inspiration is a state of suspension that has 
“joyously forgotten its goal” (Agamben 
2007b: 86) to become this or that in order 
to sustain a relation of immanence with 
its own im- potentiality. To be stupid is to 
dwell in the space and time of study and 
thus find new inspiration.
In this sense, we end with a simple 
question: Can the university provide the 
free time needed to be stupefied and 
thus inspired? Can the university itself be 
a profanation of the university discourse 
given to us by Lacan and thus become 
a counter- apparatus? While apparatuses 
traditionally functioned by producing 
subjectifications, Agamben (2009) argues 
that today we face the opposite problem: 
apparatuses function through the nega-
tion of subjectivity, or through a process 
of desubjectification. Although learning is 
highly personalized (students, for instance, 
can come to develop their own learning 
roadmaps or are encouraged to use college 
to experiment or develop their interests), it 
is also depersonalizing in many respects. 
Learning submits education to the control 
of numbers, rankings, and quantitative 
measures of success. It is concerned with 
statistical mapping in order to pinpoint the 
most effective forms of pedagogy and for 
constant improvement, excellence, and 
marketization. It reduces education to cost- 
benefit analysis and institutional life to the 
finances of debt. In this sense, a counter- 
apparatus would need to open a time and 
space for the indifference of im- potential 
study. In other words, neither classical and 
romantic theories of Bildung nor mecha-
nized processes of learning will do. Rather 
we need a studious university. It is our goal 
to have provided the Marxist- psychoanalytic 
groundwork not only for personal but also 
institutional dehiscence.
Notes
1.  See, for instance, Carl Wall 1999; Agamben 
2008; Agamben 2007c; Norris 2005. See 
also monographs such as Watkin 2010; De la 
Durantaye 2009. 
2.  Exceptions include Kishik 2012, which includes a 
brief analysis of the divine violence of studying; 
Clemens 2010; Masschelein and Simons 2010. 
3.  Agamben’s work has been tangentially 
mentioned in the secondary literature on the 
university. Readings (1997) uses Agamben to 
theorize the university as a kind of inoperative 
community, and Masschelein and Simons (2011) 
also employ Agamben to think through a profane 
history or counterhistory of the university as a 
pedagogical form. Our own work grows out of 
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these engagements but furthers it in important 
ways. In particular, we are concerned with the 
practice of study as it relates to reification and 
dereification processes.
4.  On the difference between tiredness and 
exhaustion and the psychic economy of 
university life, see D’Hoest and Lewis 2015.
5.  The word itself has botanical and anatomical 
meanings. A dehiscence in fruit is the opening 
or tear in its skin at a certain moment of 
ripeness where seeds may fall out. In anatomy, 
dehiscences are large openings in the skin, 
though no organs fall out of it (in contrast to 
evisceration). For more on the significance of 
“gap” in Lacanian theory, see “Gap” in Evans 
2006: 72.
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